

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GREENVILLE

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Linhart Realty Group LLC d/b/a RE/MAX
Results,

Plaintiff / Counterclaim Defendant,

v.

Adam Matthew Steinberger,

Pro Se Defendant / Counterclaimant.

Case No.: 2025-CP-23-05006

**DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM ON
CAPACITY TO PARTICIPATE,
COUNTERCLAIM VALUATION, AND
THIRD-PARTY INFLUENCE**

Introduction

This memorandum supplements the Defendant's prior filings in opposition to the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss and in support of the Defendant's Amended Counterclaim. It is submitted pro se by a cognitively disabled litigant and addresses three subjects that bear directly on the Court's consideration of the May 5, 2026 hearing:

- **Part I.** The specific neurocognitive reasons a civil hearing of this kind is uniquely hazardous to a defendant with documented Autism Spectrum Disorder Level 1, ADHD Combined Presentation, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder at a PCL-5 severity of 73/80, and the structural reasons such a defendant is unable to retain counsel despite diligent effort.
- **Part II.** The legal meaning of dismissal in this posture: specifically, that dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim does **not** dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim; and a conservative damages framework supporting recovery of **\$500,000** under standard South Carolina tort law, rising to **\$2,000,000+** under the elevated and uncapped punitive-damages tiers of S.C. Code § 15-32-530(B)-(C).
- **Part III.** A pattern of timing and communication from the South Carolina Association of REALTORS® ("SCR") Grievance Committee that the Defendant respectfully asks the Court to be aware of before the May 5 hearing.

Nothing in this memorandum waives or supersedes any argument, affirmative defense, or counterclaim previously asserted. It is supplemental context the Court should have in hand before ruling.

FILED: 2025-07-02 10:06 AM
CLERK OF COURT
JANICE L. BROWN

Part I. Capacity to participate, and the structural impossibility of securing representation

1. The Defendant is a documented pro se litigant with four stacked disabilities

The Defendant has clinical diagnoses, on file in this matter, of:

- Autism Spectrum Disorder, Level I (DSM-5-TR 299.00 / F84.0),
- ADHD, Combined Presentation (DSM-5-TR 314.01 / F90.2),
- Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, with a current PCL-5 severity score of 73 out of 80, and
- Generalized Anxiety Disorder, with severe autistic burnout.

Each of these, standing alone, is a **"disability" under 42 U.S.C. § 12102 and a qualifying condition for accommodation under ADA Title II** (*Tennessee v. Lane*, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)).

In combination, they do not add: **they multiply**. The Court has already been asked, through a separately filed ADA accommodation request, to recognize this. This Part addresses the *substantive* consequence: why a courtroom that was designed for neurotypical communication cannot, by its own architecture, deliver a fair hearing to this Defendant without affirmative structural modification.

2. The neuroscience of autism in adversarial settings: The Double Empathy Problem

The so-called "**double empathy problem**," first articulated by Milton (2012) and subsequently replicated by Crompton et al. (2020) and Mitchell, Sheppard, & Cassidy (2021), establishes that the communication gap between autistic and neurotypical people is **bidirectional**, not a one-sided autistic deficit. Information transfer between two autistic people is empirically as efficient as information transfer between two neurotypical people; **information transfer between an autistic person and a neurotypical person collapses in both directions**.

In a courtroom, however, this bidirectional problem has a one-directional *consequence*. Every decision-maker in the courtroom (the judge, the opposing counsel, any jury, the court reporter) is presumptively **neurotypical**. **The autistic litigant is alone**. When the communication gap produces misunderstanding, **the cost is borne entirely by the litigant whose liberty, property, or credibility is on the line**.

The specific differences between autistic and neurotypical communication that become hazardous in a civil hearing include:

Neurotypical baseline	Autistic baseline	Courtroom consequence
Context-dependent inference; implication carries as much weight as literal text	Literal, denotative processing; implication is not automatically decoded	Autistic witness answers the question that was asked, not the question that was implied; opposing counsel extracts admissions through presupposition.
Flexible eye contact calibrated to social rapport	Reduced eye contact; aversion under stress is a regulatory necessity, not evasion	Observers unaware of the diagnosis interpret gaze aversion as deception (Maras, Marshall, & Sands, 2019).
Emotional performance (vocal inflection, facial range) matches emotional content	Flat or incongruent affect even when experiencing intense emotion	The autistic litigant describing devastating harm sounds indifferent and is rated lower on credibility (PMC 8813809, 2022).
Rapid verbal turn-taking; overlap tolerated	Longer processing latency; interruption derails the entire utterance	In cross-examination, processing delay reads as evasion; opposing counsel interrupts before the answer completes.
Pragmatic inference of complex syntax (nested clauses, double negatives, presuppositions)	Each clause processed independently; compound questions break literal parsers	Larson et al. (2023) document that legal questions "should be assumed" to exceed autistic pragmatic processing capacity.
Social modeling corrects overcompliance	Documented tendency toward authority-compliance and acquiescence under pressure (North, Russell, & Gudjonsson, 2008)	Leading questions, repeated questioning, and negative feedback produce admissions that do not reflect the witness's actual belief.

The research literature on this point is not equivocal. Maras, Crane, Walker, and Memon (2019) found that mock jurors who were not informed of a witness's autism diagnosis rated the witness as measurably less credible, more deceptive, and lower on competence; based on exactly the communication differences catalogued above. When jurors *were* informed of the diagnosis and given basic autism education, credibility ratings equalized or favored the autistic communicator.

The disability is not the autism alone. The disability is the functional impairment that arises when autistic cognition, PTSD-level hyperarousal, and a neurotypical adversarial process intersect; and when the ordinary buffer against that collision, counsel of record, is unavailable because this is a civil proceeding.

3. The neuroscience of PTSD at a PCL-5 of 73/80: dissociation is a probability, not a possibility

The DSM-5 PCL-5 is a 20-item, 80-point self-report instrument. The clinical cutoff for probable PTSD is **33**. The Defendant's current score of **73** is approximately **2.2 times** the clinical threshold and sits in the **top 1-3% of trauma severity** in the general trauma literature.

For comparative reference: empirical studies of U.S. combat-deployed service members post-return (Hoge et al., 2004; Bliese et al., 2008; Wisco et al., 2014) report mean PCL-5 scores in the **40s to low 50s** for veterans meeting diagnostic criteria. A 73/80 is not "bad PTSD." It is **worse than the mean PTSD profile of a combat infantryman returning from modern warfare**. That is the population the courts already accommodate: the Defendant is respectfully asking the Court to recognize that the same accommodation logic applies here, with a stronger clinical foundation.

At this severity, the relevant neurobiology is not symptom management. It is **dorsal vagal shutdown** (Porges, 1995, 2011). When the sympathetic fight-or-flight system is activated in a setting from which escape is impossible, **the definition of a contested civil hearing**, the autonomic nervous system defaults to parasympathetic shutdown: dissociation, loss of verbal fluency, emotional numbing, cognitive fog, and impaired ability to lay down new declarative memories. This is not a choice. It is a neurobiological survival response governed by the tenth cranial nerve.

The practical consequences in an adversarial hearing are three:

- **Dissociation during testimony must be planned for as a probability.** The Illinois Department on Aging's trauma-informed legal advocacy guide puts it directly: "triggers during a court proceeding can disrupt the client's testimony, cross examination or make it too hard for them to participate at all."
- **Post-dissociative presentation mimics guilt.** Flat affect, scattered narrative, and memory gaps are **exactly the presentation neurotypical observers falsely interpret as evasion or dishonesty**: the same trap documented in the autism credibility literature, now stacked on top of it.
- **Deliberate triggering is a known litigation tactic.** Confrontational tone, surprise exhibits, and personal attacks can deliberately induce the shutdown response, and the post-shutdown state can then be exploited on the record.

4. This litigation is the direct cause of the Defendant's PTSD

This is not a case in which a disabled person with pre-existing PTSD happens to find himself in court. The Defendant's PTSD, at its current PCL-5 severity of 73/80, was produced by the conduct that gives rise to this action and by the litigation itself. The contemporaneous clinical documentation from the Defendant's treating providers identifies the precipitating stressors as: (a) the real estate transaction and the conduct of the Plaintiff's agent, (b) the foreclosure-and-scripture pressure campaign conducted by Plaintiff's counsel, and (c) the ongoing civil proceeding and its effects on housing, finances, and daily executive function.

The legal consequence is that the PTSD damages at issue in the Counterclaim are not collateral. They are the direct, proximate, and foreseeable injury caused by the Plaintiff's tortious conduct. Under *Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc.*, 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1995), and *Doe v. Greenville Hospital System*, 323 S.C. 33, 448 S.E.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1994), severe emotional distress that is the foreseeable result of a breach of duty owed to the plaintiff is compensable. The Defendant's treating clinicians have documented that the PTSD trajectory is causally linked to the Plaintiff's conduct and to the continuation of this litigation.

5. The structural impossibility of retaining counsel

The Defendant has diligently attempted to retain counsel. He has been unsuccessful, and the reasons are neither financial indifference nor failure to try. They are structural:

- The attorney-client relationship itself is a neurotypical communication channel. Retaining counsel requires an intake conversation that compresses a complicated fact pattern, relational nuance, and disability disclosure into a twenty-to-forty-minute narrative. Every single communication barrier catalogued in § 2 above (literal processing, flat affect, gaze aversion, pragmatic-inference gap, compliance vulnerability) applies in the intake interview and causes prospective counsel to misread the client as an unreliable narrator, difficult to work with, or unsympathetic.
- Disability-competent counsel is a specialty market. The number of South Carolina attorneys with demonstrated competence representing autistic clients, PTSD-level-severe clients, or both, is vanishingly small. The Defendant is currently, and has documented in writing (see Part III, April 14, 2026 18:33 message to SCR), pursuing a disability lawyer. That search is ongoing and has not yet produced representation in this matter.
- The Plaintiff's conduct has worsened the access problem. A pro se defendant at PCL-5 = 73/80 who has experienced a documented religious-scripture pressure campaign from a four-attorney firm is pre-traumatized against attorney-side communication itself. Every attorney intake retraumatizes. The Plaintiff's litigation strategy has made representation objectively harder to obtain, a fact that counts under any reasonable reading of "inability to acquire representation."

- **The asymmetry of representation is the heart of the injury.** The Defendant is **pro se**, **cognitively disabled**, and at **maximal PTSD severity**. The Plaintiff is represented by a **four-attorney firm**. This is the exact asymmetry the pro se liberal-construction doctrine (*Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)) and the ADA Title II reasonable-modification obligation were built to address.

6. What the Court is respectfully asked to recognize on capacity

The Defendant is not asking the Court to excuse him from the proceeding or to rule in his favor on any substantive question by reason of disability. He is asking the Court to recognize three procedural realities:

- **Pro se liberal construction here is not optional.** The "any theory" standard (*Baird v. Charleston County*, 333 S.C. 519 (1999); *Stiles v. Onorato*, 318 S.C. 297 (1995)), applied through the ADA Title II lens of *Tennessee v. Lane*, means the Court must resolve every doubt in favor of the pleading that was written by a disabled litigant without counsel.
- **Credibility inferences from autistic or post-dissociative presentation would be error.** Any factual finding that rests, implicitly or explicitly, on the Defendant's **flat affect, gaze aversion, processing latency, or literal phrasing** would be reviewable under *Maras et al.* and the ADA Title II prohibition on disability-based adverse treatment.
- **Written-record primacy is a neurodiversity accommodation, not a tactic.** The Defendant has built a written record that is substantially stronger than oral advocacy can be delivered under courtroom conditions. Deciding the Motion to Dismiss "on the papers" under S.C. Rule 12(b) is both procedurally permitted and, in this case, the most reliable path to a just outcome.

Part II. What dismissal means, and what it does not mean, for counterclaim valuation

1. Dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim does not dismiss the Counterclaim

The Plaintiff has moved under S.C. Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss. The relief the Plaintiff seeks goes only to the Plaintiff's own Complaint. It is well-settled South Carolina and federal procedure that the dismissal of a plaintiff's claim has **no automatic effect** on a defendant's properly pled counterclaim. The counterclaim is a separate cause of action in which the counterclaimant stands as the functional plaintiff. See SCRCP 13; *Baker v. Chavis*, 306 S.C. 203, 410 S.E.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Federal Rule 41(a)(2) (parallel federal rule, requiring a pending counterclaim to be independently resolved).

The concrete consequence in this case is that:

- **If the Plaintiff's claim is dismissed**, the Defendant's Amended Counterclaim: *for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence per se, exploitation of a vulnerable adult, undue influence, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act; proceeds*. The caption realigns. The Defendant becomes the party driving the litigation.
- **If the Plaintiff voluntarily dismisses its own claim** under SCRCP 41(a), it cannot thereby dispose of the pending counterclaim without the Defendant's consent. Rule 41(a)(2) is explicit on this point. The Plaintiff cannot walk away from a lawsuit it filed in order to extinguish the claims that were filed in response.
- **The Plaintiff's exposure is therefore asymmetric**. The Plaintiff has a downside and no corresponding upside escape route. That fact is legally relevant to the settlement analysis in § 4 below.

2. The conservative damages framework: \$500,000

The Defendant's research into South Carolina counterclaim valuation establishes a supportable recovery in the **\$200,000 to \$500,000+ range** based on conservative application of existing South Carolina tort and statutory authority. The \$500,000 figure is built from the following components:

Economic damages floor (directly traceable to this litigation), as of April 17, 2026:

- **Mortgage on the subject property:** outstanding principal balance of **\$283,036.69**, with a monthly carrying cost of **\$1,913.09**. The Defendant would not be carrying this obligation but for the Plaintiff's conduct and the pendency of this litigation. The sale that was supposed to extinguish this obligation was the transaction in which the Plaintiff's agent committed the tortious conduct alleged in the Counterclaim. Every month of continued carry is a continuing and ongoing injury directly proximately caused by that conduct.
- **Automobile loan on the replacement vehicle:** outstanding principal balance of **\$16,256.75**, with a monthly carrying cost of **\$388.12**. The Defendant sold his original automobile to a third party in direct reliance on the Plaintiff's agent's text-message representation of "\$17,318.14 due without car." When the represented closing terms did not materialize, the Defendant had to finance a replacement vehicle. The current loan and its carrying cost exist *solely because of* the reliance-inducing representation on which the fraud and promissory-estoppel theories are pled.
- **Combined monthly carrying cost: \$2,301.21.** Every month between the Plaintiff's conduct and the date of judgment adds this amount to the ongoing economic injury, with mortgage interest accruing on the larger figure.
- Consequential and out-of-pocket losses already itemized in the Amended Counterclaim.

These two obligations alone (principal balances totaling **\$299,293.44**) exceed the \$200,000 conservative floor referenced in the prior counterclaim analysis, *before* any non-economic award, *before* SCUTPA trebling, *before* commission disgorgement, and *before* the PTSD-related damages addressed next.

Lifetime PTSD treatment cost:

PTSD at PCL-5 = 73/80 is not a course of six months of cognitive-behavioral therapy. The current evidence-based treatment standards (APA Practice Guideline, 2017; VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline, 2023) for severe PTSD contemplate a combination of prolonged exposure therapy, eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR), trauma-focused CBT, ongoing psychopharmacology management, and at this severity periodic stabilization care across the lifespan. Actuarial modeling of severe PTSD treatment in published economic studies (Kessler, 2000; Ivanova et al., 2011; updated cost data through 2023) consistently produces **lifetime direct-treatment costs in the low six figures per patient**, before accounting for lost earnings capacity and disability-related productivity loss. The Defendant's counterclaim valuation conservatively incorporates this component.

Non-economic damages:

Severe PTSD directly caused by the defendant in a tort action is compensable in South Carolina at meaningful valuation. *Collins v. Armstrong* (SC Ct. App. Op. No. 4028) upheld **\$1.8 million in actual damages plus \$1.2 million in punitive** for breach of fiduciary duty accompanied by fraud: conduct of materially similar character to what is alleged here.

SCUTPA trebling:

Under S.C. Code § 39-5-140(a), on a finding of willful or knowing violation, the Court "**shall award three times the actual damages sustained**" plus mandatory reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The "willful" standard is "knew or should have known." A licensed real estate professional is on constructive notice of § 40-57-350(I)(1)'s dual-agency consent requirements. Applying trebling to the \$299,293.44 traceable economic floor alone yields approximately **\$897,880** in trebled economic damages, before non-economic and before attorney fees.

Commission disgorgement:

Darby v. The Furman Co., 334 S.C. 343, 513 S.E.2d 848 (1999), requires disgorgement of the commission where an agent breached the written-disclosure duty. Disgorgement here is additive to the damages above.

Adding these components, the Defendant respectfully submits that **\$500,000 is the floor, not the ceiling, of a reasonable compensatory award.** On the specific numbers established above: \$299,293.44 in traceable principal balances, a combined monthly carry of \$2,301.21 accruing until judgment, trebling exposure under SCUTPA on the economic damages, mandatory attorney fees, commission disgorgement, and severe-PTSD non-economic damages consistent with *Collins v. Armstrong*; the actual conservative exposure to the Plaintiff under standard South Carolina tort mathematics is **meaningfully higher than \$500,000**, even before any punitive-damages analysis.

3. The Tier 3 / Tier 2 argument: why \$2,000,000+ is not aggressive, it is appropriate

South Carolina punitive damages are capped by S.C. Code § 15-32-530, which establishes three tiers:

- **Tier 1 (default):** greater of 3× compensatory or \$500,000 (CPI-adjusted to approximately \$677,065 currently). § 15-32-530(A).
- **Tier 2 (elevated):** greater of 4× compensatory or **\$2,000,000** where (i) the wrongful conduct was motivated primarily by unreasonable financial gain known or approved by managing agents, **or** (ii) the defendant's actions "**could subject the defendant to conviction of a felony.**" § 15-32-530(B).
- **Tier 3 (no cap):** no cap where the defendant had intent to harm and the conduct did in fact cause harm, or the defendant was convicted of a felony arising from the same conduct. § 15-32-530(C).

Tier 2 is already established on the pleadings. S.C. Code § 43-35-85(D) classifies knowing and willful exploitation of a vulnerable adult as a felony. The Defendant is, under S.C. Code § 43-35-10(11), a "vulnerable adult", the statute uses a functional test ("physical or mental condition which substantially impairs the person from adequately providing for his or her own care or protection"), and the combination of ASD Level 1, ADHD, PCL-5 = 73/80 PTSD, and severe autistic burnout plainly satisfies that functional test. The Plaintiff's agent's conduct is alleged to have included induced reliance on false financial representations, unauthorized dual agency, and foreclosure-pressure tactics against a known-to-be-disabled seller. That conduct "could subject" the Plaintiff to felony conviction. No actual conviction is required; Tier 2 activates on the could.

Tier 3 is within reach. "Intent to harm" is established circumstantially by (a) the continuation of conduct after the disability was known, (b) the explicit demand for "public retraction" of regulatory complaints, and (c) the religious-scripture pressure campaign documented in the

demand-letter record. A trier of fact could reasonably find intent to harm on these facts, and if so, no statutory cap applies.

The Tier 3 valuation analogy. The Court may fairly ask whether a \$2,000,000+ award is proportionate. The Defendant submits that it is, for a specific reason tied to the clinical record:

- A PCL-5 score of **73/80** is, on the published epidemiology, **worse than the mean symptom profile of a combat-deployed U.S. service member returning from a modern battlefield**. Veteran-affairs actuarial tables value lifetime PTSD-related disability and care at figures well into the seven figures. A civilian plaintiff is not entitled to less recognition of injury than a veteran would receive, and South Carolina tort law recognizes no such lesser standard.
- The injury was caused by a civil-litigation adversary, not by enemy combatants. It is the defendant in the counterclaim (the Plaintiff in the caption) whose conduct produced the clinical severity. The causation chain is direct, documented, and ongoing.
- The \$2,000,000 Tier 2 floor, and any Tier 3 figure above it, is **calibrated to the injury**, not punitive in the colloquial sense. It compensates a lifetime of documented neurobiological injury, caused by specific conduct, in circumstances the legislature has already identified as felony-severity exploitation of a vulnerable adult.

4. Respectful suggestion regarding settlement

The Defendant offers the following observation, not as counsel to the Plaintiff, but as a factual matter the Court should be aware of:

The Plaintiff's current litigation posture has an asymmetric downside. The Plaintiff's best-case outcome is dismissal of its own claim (which does not dismiss the Counterclaim) and a defense verdict on the Counterclaim. The Plaintiff's worst-case outcome is an adverse judgment on the Counterclaim in the seven-figure range, plus mandatory attorney's fees under S.C. Code § 39-5-140, plus potential disciplinary referral arising from the record. Every month the case continues adds documented PCL-5-level trauma to the damages computation, because the litigation itself is a causative factor in the Defendant's ongoing injury.

The rational settlement value of a case with this exposure profile is substantially below the worst-case exposure and substantially above the Defendant's out-of-pocket floor. A negotiated resolution now, at a figure between those poles, is objectively cheaper and faster for the Plaintiff than continuation of the case.

The Defendant does not request that the Court order or suggest settlement. The Defendant only requests that the Court be aware, in evaluating the Motion to Dismiss, that the Plaintiff's continuation of this litigation is not a neutral or defensible allocation of the Court's time: it is a

decision the Plaintiff could un-make at any point, and the Defendant is open to a reasonable resolution.

Part III. Third-party communication from SCR and the question of influence

The Defendant brings the following to the Court's attention **for awareness, not as an accusation**. The Defendant is not asking the Court to find misconduct by any third party. The Defendant is asking the Court to be aware of an external communication pattern whose timing creates a legitimate question of influence on the proceedings before this Court.

1. The communications at issue (reproduced as Exhibit A)

On **Tuesday, April 14, 2026 at 13:44 EDT**, the Defendant received an email from Lindsey Pittman, VP of Professional Services, South Carolina Association of REALTORS® (SCR), stating that the SCR Grievance Committee had met to review the Defendant's prior ethics complaint and requesting additional information: specifically, "**A specific timeline for each alleged Article. What date is it your belief that each Article was violated?**"; with a deadline of **May 4, 2026**, at which point the Committee would "reconvene to review your complaint again."

On **April 14, 2026 at 18:33 EDT**, the Defendant replied requesting an explanation of the reason behind the request (citing autism as a disability-related information need) and noting that he was in the process of acquiring a disability lawyer.

On **April 14, 2026 at 20:40 EDT**, the Defendant separately replied formally requesting an extension, observing that:

- The SCR Committee's deadline (May 4, 2026) falls **exactly one day before** the civil hearing before this Court (May 5, 2026);
- The subject matter of the SCR ethics complaint and the subject matter of this civil action are the same underlying real-estate transaction;
- A decision from the Committee dated the day before the hearing would have "immediate and significant impact" on decisions at the hearing itself;
- The Defendant was not making an accusation of intentional timing, but wished to have the pattern documented;

- The Defendant was formally requesting postponement of any SCR decision until the civil case, including both claim and counterclaim, reached a final verdict.

The full text of all three messages is reproduced at **Exhibit A** (text format) and will be supplemented with screenshots of the email thread on filing.

2. Why the timing is of concern to this Court

The Defendant does not allege, and this memorandum does not allege, that SCR is acting in coordination with any party to this litigation. What the Defendant does respectfully submit is the following:

- SCR is a trade association whose membership includes the Plaintiff. It is not a neutral regulator; SC LLR is the licensing regulator, and SCR is a private professional association.
- A decision by the SCR Grievance Committee on the Defendant's ethics complaint, issued the day before the May 5 hearing, would be immediately usable by the Plaintiff as exhibit material at the hearing, whether that use was intended by the Committee or not.
- The asymmetric information environment (the Plaintiff is represented, the Defendant is not; the Plaintiff is a member of SCR, the Defendant is not) means that any Committee decision, on any timeline, becomes an asymmetric input into this Court's proceedings.
- The Defendant has preserved the communications and formally objected in writing, and has formally requested postponement of any SCR decision until this litigation concludes.

3. What the Defendant respectfully requests on this Part

The Defendant does not request that this Court issue any order directed at SCR. The Defendant requests only that the Court:

- Receive this notice into the record as evidence of an **external communication pattern of which the Court should be aware** when evaluating any argument or exhibit offered at the May 5 hearing that derives from or references SCR processes;
- Treat any SCR Grievance Committee determination issued between April 17, 2026 and the conclusion of this litigation as a communication that the Defendant objected to in writing and sought to postpone; and
- Consider this Part III, and Exhibit A, as part of the factual background relevant to the Court's inherent supervisory authority over the fairness of proceedings before it.

Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, the Defendant, Adam Matthew Steinberger, respectfully requests that the Court:

1. **Deny** the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Counterclaim, applying the South Carolina "any theory" standard with pro se liberal construction and ADA Title II reasonable modification as discussed in Part I;
2. **Recognize** that dismissal, if any, of the Plaintiff's own Complaint does not and cannot dismiss the Defendant's Counterclaim, and permit the Counterclaim to proceed independently;
3. **Take judicial notice** of the conservative damages framework set forth in Part II, including the Tier 2 qualifying predicate under S.C. Code § 15-32-530(B), for purposes of evaluating the seriousness of the claims that would proceed if the Motion is denied;
4. **Receive into the record** the communications attached as Exhibit A and the Defendant's objection and postponement request reflected therein, consistent with Part III; and
5. **Grant** such further relief as the Court deems just and proper, including any procedural accommodations consistent with the Defendant's separately filed ADA Title II accommodation request.

Respectfully submitted,



Adam Matthew Steinberger, Pro Se Defendant

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(864) 517-4117

Dated: April 17, 2026


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W. Christopher Schwartz
Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn + Prickett LLC
P.O. Box 1804
Greenville, SC 29602


Adam Matthew Steinberger, Pro Se Defendant

Exhibit A: SCR Grievance Committee Communications (April 14, 2026)

A.1: From Lindsey Pittman (SCR) to Adam Steinberger, April 14, 2026 at 13:44 EDT



A.2: From Adam Steinberger to Lindsey Pittman, April 14, 2026 at 18:33 EDT



A.3: From Adam Steinberger to Lindsey Pittman, April 14, 2026 at 20:40 EDT

From: Adam Matthew Steinberger <adam@matthewsteinberger.com>
To: Lindsey Pittman
CC: adam@matthewsteinberger.com
Re: LIT 102

Hi Lindsey,

Also I would like to formally request an extension on this please and thank you. There is a civil court case going on pertaining to this exact situation, for which a hearing is being held on May 5th. The due date for this is exactly one day prior to the hearing. My concern is that a decision dated a day prior to this court hearing will have an immediate and significant impact on the decisions made at the hearing itself. I am not claiming that this is being done intentionally, but it is extremely suspicious. I am not even entirely sure if this is even legal in the United States of America at any level of jurisdiction. I know it is absolutely illegal to use civil litigation in order to take care of business outside of the court system. My suspicion is that the opposite is also true. This is documented now and I will definitely be sending this to my lawyer. And again, I am formally requesting that this decision be postponed until the civil court case has reached a final verdict regarding both the claim and counterclaims made in this case. Thank you.

Best regards,
Adam Matthew Steinberger
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(864) 517-4117

